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ABSTRACT
Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that 
eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter 
question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of 
two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, 
and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses 
whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it argues 
that Subjective Rationality cannot account for intersubjective conflicts. Second, it presents 
putative counterexamples to Joint Satisfaction. The counterexamples arise on the assump-
tion that the attitudes are first personal. The paper then explores two alternatives: nihilism 
about attitudinal conflicts, and dropping the assumption that the relevant attitudes are 
first-personal states. Embracing nihilism would be devastating for expressivists and other 
non-cognitivists. But dropping the assumption on which the counterexamples to Satisfac-
tion depend requires a new account of the conative attitudes expressed in value discourse. 
The paper concludes by pointing to an alternative.
Keywords: value discourse, conflicting attitudes, disagreement.
Introduction 
Many authors agree that conflict expressed through discourse eludes purely semantic ap-
proaches. The idea is crucial to metaethical expressivism. The explanatory task of expressivists 
has focused, to a large extent, on how sentences express certain kinds of conative attitudes. Yet 
theorists have not been entirely successful in answering the question of how and why conative atti-
tudes conflict. The latter question is the object of this paper. How should conflicting attitudes be 
explained? Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two schemas. The first imposes 
a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second requires the impossibil-
ity of Joint Satisfa ion. 
This paper assesses the two models of conflicting conative attitudes. The first section ar-
gues that Subjective Rationality cannot account for intersubjective conflicts. The second sec-
tion presents putative counterexamples to Joint Satisfa ion. ‘The counterexamples arise on the 
assumption that the attitudes are first-personal singular. The third section explores two alter-
natives: nihilism about attitudinal conflicts, and dropping the assumption that the relevant at-
titudes are first-personal states. Embracing nihilism would be devastating for expressivists and 
other non-cognitivists. But dropping the assumption on which counterexamples to Satisfa ion 
depend requires a new account of the conative attitudes expressed in value discourse. The paper 
concludes, in the last section, by pointing to such an alternative.
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Subjective rationality
Stevenson’s Facts and Values (1963) starts by clarifying 
the nature of ethical disagreement, drawing a distinction 
between doxastic and conative disagreements. Philosophers, 
mostly meta-ethicists, have assumed that his distinction 
tracks a real difference: 
Let us begin by noting that ‘disagreement’ 
has two broad senses: In the first sense it 
refers to what I shall call ‘disagreement in 
belief.’ This occurs when Mr. A believes p, 
when Mr. B believes not-p, or something 
incompatible with p, and when neither is 
content to let the belief of the other remain 
unchallenged. […] In the second sense the 
word refers to what I shall call ‘disagree-
ment in attitude.’ This occurs when Mr. A 
has a favourable attitude to something, 
when Mr. B has an unfavourable or less fa-
vourable attitude to it, and when neither is 
content to let the other’s attitude remain 
unchanged (Stevenson, 1963, p. 1).
Stevenson then explains what he means by “disagree-
ment in belief ” and “disagreement in attitude”:
The difference between the two senses of 
‘disagreement’ is essentially this: the first 
involves an opposition of beliefs, both of 
which cannot be true, and the second in-
volves an opposition of attitudes, both of 
which cannot be satisfied (Stevenson, 1963, 
p. 2).
Expressivists hold that evaluative sentences express 
desire-like states. Hybrid forms of expressivism account for 
evaluative thought and discourse by combining the attitu-
dinal conative component expressed in discourse and the 
truth-conditional semantic content that is encoded. 
Schroeder (2009) outlines the various alternatives on 
offer, as well as the central questions addressed by the differ-
ent positions. According to him, the answers to four crucial 
questions constitute the conceptual map of hybrid expressiv-
ism. The questions are:
Q1: Do different sentences containing the word ‘wrong’ 
express different desire-like states?
Q2: Do different  eakers express different desire-like 
states with the same sentence?
Q3: Does a given sentence have a different descriptive 
content for different  eakers?
Q4: Does the descriptive content of a sentence depend 
on the desire-like state it expresses? (Schroeder, 2009, p. 261)
The fact that these questions demarcate its conceptual 
space shows that explaining conflicts of attitudes is crucial to 
hybrid expressivism. Any answer expressivists give presup-
poses that there are two forms of disagreement: disagreement 
in “attitude” and disagreement in “belief ”. Sentences contain-
ing words like ‘wrong’ will (directly or indirectly) express de-
sire-like states.
Schroeder is almost unique in the literature in voicing a 
worry about expressivism (Schroeder, 2008). He points out 
that most expressivists merely assume that pairs of (different) 
conative attitudes are incompatible, or inconsistent, without 
explaining how they conflict. I share the concern:
I think that none of these looks remotely 
satisfactory as an expressivist explanation 
of why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murder-
ing is not wrong’ are inconsistent. None 
answers the basic question of what makes 
disapproval and tolerance of murdering 
inconsistent with one another. Each posits 
that there are such mental states that are 
inconsistent with one another, but none ex-
plains why (Schroeder, 2008, p. 587).
Recently, contextualists and relativists have also tried 
to explain resilient impressions of disagreement in value dis-
course by pointing to the expression of conflicting conative 
attitudes.2 Contextualists and relativists face the same chal-
lenge as expressivists: why are certain conative states incom-
patible? The challenge is to explain how and why conative at-
titudes conflict.
How should conflicting attitudes be explained? Two 
conditions are implicit in Stevenson’s quote above. The first 
condition is one of subjective rationality. This corresponds to 
cases where one subject has a “favourable attitude to some-
thing”, and the other has an “unfavourable or less favourable 
attitude to it”. The second condition is one of satisfa ion. The 
conditions can be expressed as:
 Subjective Rationality Subject A’s φ attitude conflicts 
with subject B’s ψ attitudes just in case it is not possible 
for an individual to rationally have a pair of attitudes φ 
and ψ.
 Satisfa ion Subject A’s φ attitude conflicts with subject 
B’s ψ attitudes just in case subject A’s and subject B’s atti-
tudes cannot be jointly satisfied.
Several authors uphold Subjective Rationality as a gen-
eral principle of doxastic and non-doxastic disagreements. 
For example, Kölbel (2004) and Egan (2012) clearly have a 
rationality condition in mind. In spite of the apparent plausi-
bility of a rationality condition for doxa ic disagreements, the 
condition is problematic in the non-doxastic case. 
2 Expressivists, Stevenson (1963), Blackburn (1984), or Gibbard (1990, 2003), relativists, MacFarlane (2014), Egan (2012), and contextu-
alists, Sundell (2011), Huvenes (2012), Marques (2015, 2016), all embrace this.
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In the first place, it is not clear whether one is irrational 
just because one has a pair of different conative attitudes like 
desires, or even other emotions (e.g., love and hate, fear and 
hope). There are reasons to be sceptical. In the Treatise, Hume 
argued that:
[I]t is only in two senses, that any affection 
can be called unreasonable. First, When a 
passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, 
despair or security, is founded on the sup-
position or the existence of objects, which 
really do not exist. Secondly, When in exert-
ing any passion in action, we chuse means 
insufficient for the designed end, and de-
ceive ourselves in our judgment of caus-
es and effects. Where a passion is neither 
founded on false suppositions, nor chuses 
means insufficient for the end, the under-
standing can neither justify nor condemn it 
(Hume, 1978, II, iii, 3, p. 415).
For Hume, there are two ways for “an affection” to be 
unreasonable: 
(i)  Its object does not exist, or 
(ii)  The means chosen for the desired end are insuffi-
cient and the “affection” is not satisfied. 
These two conditions point towards unreasonableness, 
not irrationality, and are grounded on the impossibility of 
satisfa ion. One may wish that one’s deceased relative hadn’t 
died. The wish may be unreasonable, because it is unsatis-
fiable, but one is not irrational for desiring one’s relatives to 
be still living. If Hume is right, the subjective reasonableness 
constraint for conative attitudes depends on the conditions of 
satisfa ion of those attitudes. A subject’s attitudes are in con-
flict, in the Humean sense, if the satisfa ion of one attitude 
precludes the satisfa ion of the other attitude. More gener-
ally, it is unreasonable for a subject to have a pair of conative 
attitudes just in case they can’t be jointly satisfied.
 Reasonableness Constraint It is reasonable for A to have 
conative attitudes φ and ψ only if satisfa ion conditions 
C(φ) and C(ψ) are met.
In the second place, the fact that it is unreasonable for A to 
have certain attitudes φ and ψ, because A cannot satisfy both φ 
and ψ, tells us nothing about a conflict between A and B when 
A has an attitude φ and B has an attitude ψ. After all, it is pos-
sible that A’s attitude φ and B’s attitude ψ are jointly satisfiable. 
For example, it may be unreasonable for A to want to  end the 
weekend hiking in the Alps and sunbathing in Gran Canaria. Yet, 
there is no conflict between A and B when they desire to  end 
their weekends doing different things (unless there is a presump-
tion that they should be doing those things together). 
Moreover, it is also possible that two people are in con-
flict even when they have the same attitudes towards the 
same things. Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton both want-
ed to be the 45th President of the United States. In a relevant 
sense, they both desired the same thing.3 Yet only one of them 
could be the next president. It is hence possible for two people 
A and B to have conflicting attitudes in spite of having the 
same desire to φ. 
It follows that having different desires, or desiring dif-
ferent things, is neither sufficient nor necessary for having 
conflicts of desires, as the examples discussed testify. Further 
examples can be easily produced. David Lewis elegantly made 
the same point:
If Jack Sprat and his wife both prefer fat 
meat, they desire alike. They are psycholog-
ical duplicates, on this matter at least. But 
they do not agree in their desires, because 
no possible arrangement could satisfy them 
both. Whereas if Jack prefers the lean and 
his wife the fat, then they differ psycholog-
ically, they do not desire alike. But they do 
agree, because if he eats no fat and she 
eats no lean, that would satisfy them both. 
In general, they desire alike if and only if 
they desire de se to have exactly the same 
properties and they desire de dicto that the 
same propositions hold. They agree in de-
sires if and only if exactly the same world 
would satisfy the desires of both; and a 
world that satisfies someone’s desires is one 
wherein he has all the properties that he de-
sires de se and wherein all the propositions 
hold that he desires de dicto. Agreement 
in desire makes for harmony; desiring alike 
may well make for strife (Lewis, 2000, p. 75, 
my emphasis).
Here, Lewis distinguishes two notions: desiring alike 
and agreeing in desires. The first applies to “psychological du-
plicates”, people with the same desires and dispositions. The 
second applies to the possibility of joint satisfa ion. Desiring 
alike may well make for strife, i.e., having the same desires is 
no guarantee of agreement.
There are two reasons to reject the idea that Subjective 
Rationality gives the conditions for intersubjective attitudi-
nal conflict. First, the subjective unreasonableness of holding 
two attitudes φ and ψ depends on their joint unsatisfiability. 
Second, even if having some attitudes φ and ψ is subjective-
ly unreasonable, that fact is neither sufficient nor necessary 
for intersubjective conflict between someone’s attitude φ and 
someone else’s attitude ψ.
3 This is one of the motivations for Lewis’s (2000) notion of de se desires the conditions of satisfaction of their desires differ, but in a 
relevant sense they desire alike.
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The next section considers whether Satisfa ion offers 
more promising conditions for conflict, and presents an ap-
parent counterexample. 
Satisfaction
For Stevenson, a “disagreement in attitudes” involves an 
opposition of attitudes that cannot be jointly satisfied. If Sat-
isfa ion is to capture the conditions under which conflicting 
attitudes occur, more has to be said about why certain pairs of 
attitudes give rise to conflicts. 
Now, the Satisfa ion principle does not apply to many 
attitudinal conflicts over appraisals and evaluations where it 
presumably should apply. It fails because it is possible that two 
different people prima facie have an attitudinal conflict, but 
have jointly satisfiable attitudes. Suppose that A and B have a 
dialogue like (1), where they seem to express a conflict.
(1) A: I like fatty meat.
 B: Well, I don’t like fatty meat!4
The example is important for assessing the possibility 
of hybrid expressivism accounting for attitudinal conflicts, 
as well as those of other recent theories, like some versions 
of relativism and of contextualism.5 The dialogue in (1) il-
lustrates the kind of explanation of disputes that theorists 
seek. The sentences used semantically express truth-condi-
tional (‘descriptive’) content. If we assume that A and B are 
sincere, what they say is true. Moreover, A and B express 
their re ective attitudes towards fatty meat—A likes it, B 
doesn’t. A has a disposition to have certain pleasurable re-
sponses when eating fatty meat. ‘B has a disposition to have 
certain responses of disgust when faces with the pro ect of 
eating fatty meat. 
In (1), the non-doxastic attitudes conveyed can both be 
satisfied. A’s disposition to enjoy fatty meat is satisfied if she 
indeed feels pleasure while eating fatty meat. B’s disposition 
to be disgusted by it is satisfied insofar as B refrains from ap-
proaching fatty meat entirely. Since both dispositions towards 
fatty meat can be satisfied—A can eat what she desires and B 
can refrain from eating what she doesn’t desire—there seem 
to be no grounds for those desires to be in conflict, apart from 
the fact that they are different. Notice that if the attitudes at 
stake were liking and being indifferent to there would still be 
no conflict. A can eat what she likes and enjoys, and B has no 
preference either way.6
There is nothing extraordinary about this case. The 
same counterexamples arise whether the attitudes at stake 
are being for or being against, approving and disapproving, desiring 
and not desiring, etc. The important assumption here is:
 (A) The conative attitude expressed is first-personal sin-
gular, e.g.: my desire for coffee.
This raises an apparent problem for Satisfa ion. There 
are cases where people have first-personal attitudes that are 
jointly satisfiable but are in conflict. 
We could ask why we cannot appeal to the Subjective 
Rationality constraint. After all, A and B are perceived to be 
in conflict in (1) and neither can accept the other’s attitude 
without changing her mind. Unfortunately, this response ig-
nores three issues. 
First, it is not fortuitous that we mention rationality in 
connection with disagreement and conflict. The motivation 
for the Subjective Rationality constraint is not merely that it is 
not possible to have a certain pair of attitudes. The link between 
A and B disagreeing when A believes p and B believes not-p, and 
A’s irrationality in believing both p and not-p is not accidental. If 
p is a standard possible world proposition, A and B cannot be 
both right because their beliefs are contradictory. For the same 
reason, A cannot have a coherent set of beliefs if she believes p 
and not-p. For standard propositions, the impossibility of joint 
truth grounds both the disagreement between A and B and A’s 
irrationality. However, the first section warned us of the diffi-
culties in extending this idea to conative states.
Second, the impossibility here is not one of rationality or 
lack of coherence. It is, at best, one of physical impossibility. 
In other words, we are assuming that having one disposition 
is physically incompatible with having the other disposition. 
We are assuming that if A is delighted to eat fatty meat, she 
cannot at the same time be disgusted or indifferent to it. And 
we may even be mistaken in supposing that there is any phys-
ical incompatibility. Perhaps there is none. Perhaps there are 
things that delight A precisely because they disgust her (some 
dark jokes, horror films, Halloween tricks, etc.).
 Clearly, the presumed incompatibility here is not one of 
rational coherence. If A were delighted with fatty meat, and B 
indifferent towards it, B could not adopt A’s attitude without 
‘changing her mind’. The presumed incompatibility does not 
result from the irrationality of having both attitudes, but from 
the physical impossibility of having an attitude towards some-
thing while being indifferent towards the same thing.
4 A similar example is discussed by Sundell (2011) to illustrate, precisely, how two people may express disagreement or be in conflict 
even though they don’t disagree about the literal content expressed. It is obvious to them that they are speaking honestly.
5 Authors like MacFarlane (2014), Egan (2012), López de Sa (2008), Sundell (2011), and Huvenes (2012) make similar claims—that evalu-
ative discourse conveys conative attitudes that may conflict.
6 As Clotilde Calabi pointed out in personal conversation, it may be argued that some conative attitudes do not even have satisfaction 
conditions. If the attitudes are emotions, this will be the case. Someone can be rational and have mixed emotions towards something. 
And prima facie there is no basis for an intersubjective conflict of emotions. Perhaps, as Torfinn Huvenes also suggested in personal 
conversation, emotional states have functional roles. But it is unclear how this could provide a blueprint for emotional conflicts. 
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Third, not all dialogues like (1) express conflicts. When 
we give examples of conflicting attitudes like the above, we 
tend to fill in the context of the dialogue in such a way as to 
understand it as an expression of a conflict. But we can just as 
well imagine that two friends are at a re aurant responding 
to the waiter’s suggestions from the menu.
(2)  Waiter: Today’s two  ecials are a traditional dish 
of the Cerdanya—fatty meat with mashed potatoes 
and green cabbage, or cod with grilled vegetables.
A: I like fatty meat.
B: I don’t like fatty meat. 
A chooses one option, uttering ‘I like fatty meat’, and B 
chooses the cod, uttering ‘I don’t like fatty meat’. In (2), A and 
B are sincere, and their utterances are literally true. The in-
terlocutors conversationally implicate which dish they prefer. 
They can do so because it is relevant to the conversation to 
tell the waiter what they prefer. Notice further that it is still 
true that B could not acquire A’s attitude towards fatty meat 
without changing her mind. And yet (2) does not a report 
conflict between A and B. 
In what sense are A and B’s different dispositions to-
wards fatty meat in conflict in dialogue (1)? As long as A and 
B concur in not forcing their choices on each other, both can 
have their preferences satisfied. An appeal to different indi-
vidual dispositions by itself does not explain why even in this 
case they seem to disagree. If each of them expresses a per-
sonal preference, with no consequences for what the other 
will eat, where is the remaining conflict? Given that we have 
dismissed Subjective Rationality, and that Satisfa ion also 
seems unable to explain conflict when the attitudes at stake 
are first-personal, we are faced with a puzzle. The next section 
puts forward two alternative ways to handle the puzzle
Two responses
This section considers two responses to the puzzle of 
conflicting attitudes. The first adopts a nihilistic error-theo-
retical view about attitudinal conflicts. The second drops the 
assumption (A) on which the putative counterexamples to 
Satisfa ion depend.
Nihilism
Suppose that we take seriously the reasons against Ra-
tionality as a condition on attitudinal conflicts, and moreover 
that we accept that conflicts occur only when those attitudes 
cannot be jointly satisfied. This means that a great number of 
apparent conflicts of attitudes are not real. 
This is a disaster for various kinds of value theories. 
Any theory that relies on desire-like attitudes to explain 
“disagreement in attitude” would be undermined. At best, 
such a theory would be able to accommodate doxastic dis-
agreements—insofar as it predicts doxastic disagreements at 
all. For instance, if what is evaluative and motivating in (3) is 
A’s favourable dispositions towards fatty meat, it would seem 
that those dispositions can be satisfied if and when A enjoys 
eating it. If B utters the sentence in (4) expressing her unfa-
vourable disposition towards fatty meat, it would seem that 
her dispositions would be satisfied as long as she does not eat 
fatty meat.
(3) A: Fatty meat is good (in fact, it’s delicious).
(4) B: Fatty meat is not good (actually, it’s disgusting).
Although sentences (3) and (4) appear to contradict 
each other, the conative attitudes they express are not in con-
flict, since they are jointly satisfiable. 
Expressivism about moral sentences holds that these 
sentences are conventional ways of expressing certain kinds 
of attitudes.7 Simple naïve expressivism makes sentences like 
‘fatty meat is bad’ express attitudes akin to those expressed 
by ‘Yuck, fatty meat!’ and interprets ‘fatty meat is bad’ as 
an expression of a  eaker’s disgust for fatty meat. A similar 
explanation is given for moral sentences, where a sentence 
like ‘lying is bad’ expresses attitudes like those expressed in 
‘Boo lying!’ 
An alternative to simple expressivism is hybrid expres-
sivism. It has recently been defended in different ways by var-
ious authors, like Barker (2000), Copp (2001), Finlay (2005), 
Ridge (2006), and also Boisvert (2008). Hybrid expressivism 
tries to preserve some form of cognitivism in value discourse 
while at the same time holding that moral statements express 
conative attitudes. Different hybrid theories combine these 
two claims in some way:
(I)  An evaluative predicate, like ‘good’/‘bad’, expresses a 
property that contributes to the truth-conditions of 
the sentences where it occurs.
(II)  Speakers express a non-doxastic attitude towards 
that property (which accounts for the motivational 
force of moral discourse and thought).
A semantic contextualist can also advocate these two 
claims. For instance, Huvenes (2012) claims that two people dis-
agree just in case they have incompatible or conflicting attitudes. 
He holds that disagreements arise from incompatible beliefs, but 
may also arise from conflicting desires or preferences. The kinds of 
attitudes that Huvenes considers are examples like liking chilli and 
disliking chilli, which resemble our liking/disliking fatty meat. 
7 For instance, in discussing disputes about abortion, Blackburn says that expressivism ‘locates the disagreement where it should be, in 
the clash of attitudes towards contraception’ (Blackburn, 1984, p. 168). Other forms of expressivism can also be defended: aesthetic 
expressivism, epistemic expressivism, or expressivism about personal taste. See for instance Chrisman (2012) or Grajner (2015).
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The arguments of the first and second sections show 
that having different first-personal desires is not in itself a ba-
sis for conflict. If we cannot explain how and why conflicts of 
attitudes arise in these crucial cases, we cannot assume that 
a mere difference in first-personal attitudes amounts to con-
flict. Given the arguments against Subjective Rationality and 
in favour of Satisfa ion, and given the assumption (A) (that 
the conative attitudes conveyed are first-personal singular), it 
should follow that we are generally mistaken in thinking that 
disagreements about value express conflicting attitudes. And 
if this is right, Stevenson’s notion of a disagreement in attitude 
over matters of value—an opposition of attitudes, where it is 
impossible for both to be satisfied—does not correspond to 
any real phenomena.
First-person plural
The conclusion reached in the previous section is that 
if the conative attitudes expressed in disputes over matters 
of value are first-personal singular, then we are mistaken in 
assuming that people disagree about values only when they 
have conflicting desire-like states. Should we reject assump-
tion (A), that the relevant attitudes are first-personal singu-
lar? What would an alternative look like?
On Lewis’s (2000) account of value, “something of the 
appropriate category is a value if and only if we would be dis-
posed, under ideal conditions, to value it” (Lewis, 2000, p. 68, 
my emphasis).
To value something, for Lewis, is to be in a certain sort 
of motivational mental state: to desire to desire it. This guar-
antees the internalist connection between value and motiva-
tion. Values are the things that we are disposed to desire to 
desire in certain ideal circumstances (of full imaginative ac-
quaintance). On this theory, to find that fatty meat tasty is 
to be disposed in the right way towards fatty meat, i.e., it is 
to value having pleasant gustatory experiences when eating fatty 
meat. And to find fatty meat is disgusting is to be disposed in 
the right way against fatty meat, i.e., to value not being in con-
tact with fatty meat. Furthermore, fatty meat is disgusting just 
in case we are disposed in the right way against it.
On the Lewisian theory, the value property expressed 
involves the relevant group to which the  eaker belongs. It is, 
if we want, a first-person plural, or de nobis,8 secondary prop-
erty. The theory offers further advantages. It is cognitivist, 
since it accounts for the evaluative property expressed by the 
value predicate or word—and it can be true or false that fatty 
meat is tasty (or disgusting), and even that A (or B) can be 
mistaken about fatty meat’s being tasty or not. At the same 
time, the theory is sufficiently subjectivist and dependent on 
people’s desires to accommodate the perceived importance of 
conative attitudes in disputes of taste.
So, on a dispositional account of value like Lewis’, a value 
is a dispositional property. The disposition at stake is first-per-
son plural. This should yield the desired result. A says that fat-
ty meat is delicious. She ascribes to fatty meat the property of 
disposing us to having pleasure eating it, but B ascribes to fatty 
meat the property of disposing us to avoid it. If our desire to 
avoid fatty meat is satisfied, then we won’t eat fatty meat. On 
the other hand, if our desire to have pleasure eating fatty meat 
is satisfied, then our desire to avoid it is not satisfied. The two 
value properties consist in desire-like states that cannot be 
jointly satisfied in the same world. Hence, not only is there 
disagreement, there is also an attitudinal conflict.
A Lewisian dispositional theory has the resources to 
explain conflicting attitudes—at least among people that are 
relevantly similar in certain re ects and constitute a group 
jointly referred to as “we”. It is not my goal here to discuss 
whether and how such a collective identity is formed. My 
goal is to suggest that there is a value theory that essentially 
relies on desire-like states, and that offers better pro ects of 
accounting for “disagreements in attitude”. A theory like Lew-
is’s seems well suited to that role. It is better suited than purely 
expressivist theories, and presumably also better suited than 
some new hybrid theories.
As I have argued here, embracing nihilism would be dev-
astating for expressivist and other non-cognitivist theories. By 
dropping the assumption that the relevant conative attitudes 
expressed in value discourse are first-personal singular we can 
explain both disagreements in belief and disagreements in at-
titude, as Stevenson intended. 
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